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NEGLIGENCE VIOLATION OF A STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE TYPE OF HARM PREVENTED AND CLASS OF PERSONS TO BE BENEFITED -

Plaintiff's automobile was damaged when it collided with a horse belonging
to the defendant. The animal's running at large upon the highway claimed to
be in violation of a statute which required owners of stock and domestic animals
to restrain and prevent such animals from running at large.1 Held, the purpose
of the statute is to protect agricultural crops from the ravages of straying animals,
and not to protect motorists on the highway; therefore, the plaintiff is not of
the class of persons sought to be protected by the statute, nor his injuries of the
type sought to be prevented; thus its violation is not prima facie evidence of
negligence, and plaintiff must affirmatively prove negligence on the part of the
defendant. Champlin Refining Co. v. Cooper, 184 Okla. 153, 86 P. (2d) 61
(1938).
If a plaintiff is to recover from a defendant because of defendant's violation
of a statutory duty, the plaintiff must show that he is of the class of persons
intended to be protected by the statute,2 and that he has suffered the type of
harm which the legislature sought to prevent. 8 This is a well-settled principle
of law. 4 In the principal case, the court affirms this doctrine, finding that the
statute involved was not enacted to protect motorists on the highway for injuries received by collisions with animals running at large. Courts in other
jurisdictions, in interpreting similar statutes under similar circumstances, have
reached contrary results. 6 The arguments advanced by the court in the prin-

1 Okla. Stat. (1931), § 9006: "The owner of any stock or domestic animal prohibited by law, from running at large within the district at any time shall be liable
for all damages done thereby while wrongfully remaining at large. . ••"
2 Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk-Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N. W. 693 (1899).
a Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874); Central of Georgia Ry. v. Griffin,
35 Ga. App. I 61, 13 2 S. E. 255 ( I 926). This same result has been attained on the
basis of causation. Falk v. Finkelman, 268 Mass. 524;, 168 N. E. 89 (1929).
~ HARPER, ToRTS, § 78 (1933); 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 286, comments
e, h (1934); 20 R. C. L. 38, 41 (1918); Thayer, "Public Wrong and Private
Action," 27 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1914); Lowndes, "Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation," 16 MINN. L. REv. 361 (1932).
15 Stewart v. Wild, 196 Iowa 678, 195 N. W. 266 (1923); Moss v. Bonne Terre
Farming & Cattle Co., 222 Mo. App. 808, 10 S. W. (2d) 338 (1928). At common
law an owner of domestic animals was held strictly liable for their trespasses on the
lands of others irrespective of presence or absence of negligence on the part of the
owner. In the field of personal injuries, absolute liability is imposed if the animal is
{a) a wild beast, known from its nature to be dangerous, or (b) a domestic animal,
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cipal case to support its position are not insuperable. 6 Although it may be admitted
that the legislature could not have contemplated injuries to drivers of automobiles, because such vehicles were not in widespread use at the time of the
statute's enactment, nevertheless the legislature might have anticipated harm to
a broader class of persons, namely, travelers on the highway. Before the Oklahoma statute was enacted, courts of other states had decided a number of cases
in which users of the highway were given the protection of "running at large"
provisions. 7 In light of these decisions, it is arguable that the court in the principal case may have taken too restricted a view as to the persons intended to be
protected. Moreover, other courts have held that it is unreasonable to believe
that the legislature intended to provide for an injury to fields and crops by an
elaborate law, and did not mean to provide for injury to persons occasioned by
violation of the same law. 8 However, inasmuch as liability in any case is a matter
of statutory construction, it is not difficult to deny liability on the same grounds.
The position taken by the court in the principal case is not without authority,9
but it should be recognized that such a position is in the numerical minority
of cases of this sort.10

ordinarily harmless, but actually known to be dangerous. With respect to personal injuries by animals of neither of these classes, i.e., domestic animals not actually known to
be dangerous, the usual rules of negligence apply. Cases such as the principal one fall
within last-named category. For a discussion of the liability of owners of animals, see
HARPER, ToRTS 350-370 (1933).
6 The court relies on two arguments: (a) the legislature could not have intended
the statute to be for the protection of motorists, since it was enacted in 1903, at which
time there were few, if any, automobiles traveling on the highway; (b) the statute
provided that the injured party could distrain the animal. The court contends that this
indicates an intent to protect farmers only, because damages to agricultural crops as a
rule are small and not worthy of a suit, which fact the legislature recognized by providing an inexpensive and expeditious remedy. I 84 Okla. 15 3 at 15 5.
7 Barnes v. Chapin, 4 Allen (86 Mass.) 444 (1862) (plaintiff's colt was attacked
by defendant's mare while plaintiff was leading the colt on the highway); Jewett v.
Gage, 55 Me. 538 (1868) (plaintiff's wagon was damaged and his daughter injured
when his horse took fright at defendant's hog on the highway); Bowyer v. Burlew,
3 Thomp. (N. Y.) 362 (1"874) (plaintiff, while passing in a carriage, was injured
by defendant's horse); Shipley v. Colclough, 81 Mich. 624, 45 N. W. 1106 (1890)
(plaintiff's son, while riding in a buggy, was injured when defendant's cows overturned the vehicle).
8 Wigginton & Sweeney v. Bruce's Guardian, 174 Ky. 691, 192 S. W. 850
(1917); Decker v. McSorley, I I I Wis. 91, 86 N. W. 554 (1901).
9 Marsh v. Koons, 78 Ohio-St. 68, 84 N. E. 599 (1908).
10 See 45 A. L. R. 498 at 505 (1926), where the cases are collected.

